Abstract This paper examines the effect of the quality of regional government (QoG) on firm Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in a multi-country context. The analysis is based on comparable cross-country data of manufacturing firms operating in seven European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom). The measure of the 'quality of government' is the European quality of government index (EQI), calculated at regional level over twenty-seven EU members. To disentangle internal from external productivity drivers, the multilevel approach is employed. Results refer to 2008 and show, as expected, the importance of firmspecific determinants of TFP. As far as the specific scope of this paper is concerned, firms located in regions with high quality regional government show higher levels of TFP. When considering the QoG components, corruption and the quality of services positively affect TFP, while the evidence is inconclusive for impartiality.
Introduction
The performance of a firm is influenced by decisions made by the firm itself as well as factors external to it. Firm competencies are important but also competencies that pertain to territories (Mariani, 2004) . External factors encompass different aspects of the environmental context in which firms operate, such as physical infrastructures, innovative capacity and efficiency of the public administration.
The attention in this paper is on the effect of the quality of regional government (QoG) on the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of firms in a multi-country context.
Scholars have demonstrated that the institutional environment affects macro variables such as growth (see Jütting 2003 and Aron 2000, for a critical review), income level, productivity,  The author thanks Francesco Aiello for helpful suggestions on the initial idea of the research. I also would like to thank Lyudmila S. Ruzhanskaya and the participants of the National Research University Higher School of Economics XVII April International Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development (Moscow 19-22 April 2016) for valuable suggestions on an earlier version of the paper. Grateful acknowledgments are also due to Bruegel (www.bruegel.org) for making available the EFIGE dataset and for the easy access and use of the dataset at Brussels. Usual disclaimer applies.
multilevel approach for analysing the correlation between the regional quality of government and firm performance, measured by TFP.
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In this paper, the effect on productivity of the quality of regional government is investigated by using firm-level data in a multi-country context. The analysis is, indeed, based on comparable cross-country data of manufacturing firms operating in seven EU countries, Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.
Improved institutional quality has recently been emphasized as one of the principal objectives of the EU under the general framework of sustainable development and in the regional policy framework (Farole, Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2011) . Researchers have demonstrated that while integration in the EU to date has promoted inter-national convergence, sub-national interregional inequalities have tended to increase (Farole, Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2011) . One of the reasons could be the persistence of institutional differences between regions despite integration (Farole, Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2011; Charron and Lapuente, 2013) . 3 The so-called Europe 2020 growth strategy (European Commission, 2010) recognises that countries with a better quality of government also have a better performance and considers high quality institutions as complementary to a process of economic growth driven by innovation. Regions with a poor institutional environment are ineffective in supporting innovative activity or assimilating knowledge and innovation. Institutions are a central argument in the current discussion on policies for enhancing economic growth in the EU to recover from the ongoing economic and financial crises (Barbosa and Faria, 2011) . Previous studies have demonstrated how institutions shape the return of economic policy at the regional level in Europe and, also, the importance of government quality as a moderator of the efficiency of the spending of Structural and Cohesion Funds: in many of the regions receiving these resources, further improvements in economic growth would require massive amounts of additional investment, unless the quality of government is significantly enhanced (Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015) . The problem of regional disparities in term of productivity and institutional quality has become more pressing with the Eurozone crisis. Fingleton, Garretsen and Martin (2015) show how a common contractionary shock across the Eurozone has its biggest impact on the most geographically isolated regions, which are precisely those areas that are suffering the most acute sovereign debt crisis, as well as being the regions with the lowest productivity in the EU. Those economies are trapped in two key problems: high debt and low 2
The multilevel approach has already been applied to firm productivity by Raspe and van Oort (2011) for the Netherlands; Mahlberg et al. (2013) for Austria; Fazio and Piacentino (2010) , Aiello, Pupo, and Ricotta (2014) , Aiello, Pupo, and Ricotta (2015) for Italy; Aiello and Ricotta (2016) for the EU countries.
3 McGuiness (2007) has shown how the rate of the catch-up of poorer countries with wealthier ones is influenced by the quality of the country's institutions.
competitiveness. Understanding regional disparities in productivity is, thus, of the greatest importance in the ongoing debate about the Euro and its future.
Firm data used in this paper come from the "European Firms in a Global Economy: internal policies for external competitiveness" (EFIGE) project . Data for the regional 'quality of government' refer to the European Quality of Government Index (EQI).
This indicator provided by Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente (2014) makes use of a wide survey of respondents, living in 18 EU states, to measure the perception of the quality of regional and local governments across Europe.
To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first paper that analyses in a multi-country context, the effect on firm TFP of the within-county quality of government.
In the econometric specification, the 2008-value of TFP depends on key-characteristics of firm performance (size, family-management, group membership, innovation, human capital and export status), on the variable of interest, the indicator of the quality of government, and on control variables at the regional level that, according to the theoretical and empirical literature, may affect firms' economic performance. As expected, the results show the importance of firm-specific determinants of TFP. However, they also indicate that the context in which firms operate plays a role in determining individual TFP: being located in a region with high level of R&D and good infrastructure is correlated positively to the firm's TFP. As far as the specific scope of the paper is concerned, the results provide evidence to show that the quality of regional government has a positive effect on a firm's TFP. This is in line with previous research on the role of institutions at regional level that underlines their importance for economic growth (Tabellini, 2010; Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose 2016) , the capacity of regions to innovate (Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015) and productivity (Lasagni, Nifo and Vecchione, 2015; Aiello, Pupo and Ricotta, 2014; Manzocchi, Quintieri and Santoni, 2014) . On the contrary, the finding contradicts the hypothesis that within country institutional differences do not matter for economic performance (Gennaioli et al., 2013) .
As far as the EQI components are concerned, corruption and the quality of services appear to be positively correlated to TFP, while the evidence is inconclusive for the impartiality indicator.
Efficient and non-bureaucratic provision of public services as well as a low level of local corruption seem to be important factors for good firm performance.
The rest of the paper is organised into five sections. Next section briefly reviews the literature on quality of institutions and economic performance. Section 3 presents the EFIGE dataset and the EQI indicator in the regions of the EU-7EFIGE countries. Section 4 describes the multilevel approach and the empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the results and section 6 concludes.
Quality of institutions and economic performance: a brief overview
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society, i.e. the set of fundamental political, social, and legal rules that shape the strategic behaviours and outcomes of firms (North, 1990) . Efficient institutions reduce transaction costs and the cost of enforcing contracts and they facilitate transactions with a positive effect on economic performance. Moreover, with high quality institutions one would expect to find agents faced with incentives for productive effort rather than socially costly rent-seeking activities or predation.
A substantial body of cross-country literature documents a close correlation between institutions and development (see Jütting 2003 , for a review). Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) argue that the main determinant of differences in prosperity across countries are differences in economic institutions. On the other hand, Aron (2000) critically reviews the literature that tries to link quantitative measures of institutions with growth of gross domestic product across countries and over time. The evidence suggests a link between the quality of institutions and investment and growth, but the evidence is by no means robust. He suggests that the quality of institutions has a robust and significant indirect relationship to growth via its effect on the volume of investment, while the evidence for a direct relationship between institutions and growth is weak. Betterperforming institutions may increase the volume of investment, e.g. by eliminating excessive bureaucratic formalities and rent seeking costs, and improve the efficiency of investment by enforcing well-defined property rights. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) set out to estimate the impact of institutions on income per capita and not just their correlation and, thus, to cope with the endogeneity problem. They decide to use the mortality rates of European colonizers as an instrument for broad institutional differences across countries in an instrumental-variables estimation strategy. They argue that Europeans between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries adopted very different policies in different colonies, with different associated institutions. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and were more likely to set up "extractive institutions". Their objective in this case was to have a highly centralized state apparatus, and other associated institutions, to oppress the native population and facilitate the extraction of resources in the short run. On the contrary, in places where the environment was favorable as regards health and Europeans settled in large numbers, the settlers tried to replicate European institutions, with strong emphasis on private property and checks and balances against government power. These institutions persisted to the present. The mortality rates in colonies should not influence output today directly, but by affecting the settlement patterns of Europeans, they may have had a first-order effect on institutional development. Exploiting differences in mortality rates of European colonizers between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries as an instrument for current institutions, they estimate large effects of institutions on income per capita.
Hall and Jones (1999) focus on differences in "social infrastructure" across a sample of 127 countries as the cause of wide differences in capital accumulation, educational attainment, and productivity, and, therefore, large differences in income across countries. They call "social infrastructure" the institutions and government policies that provide the incentives for individuals and firms in an economy. The indicator they use is a combination of two indexes: one is an index of government policies for supporting policies 4 and the other captures the extent to which a country is open to international trade. 5 Hall and Jones treat social infrastructures as endogenous and provide evidence that they help to explain the differences in capital accumulation, productivity, and therefore output per worker. 6 However, Chanda and Dalgaard (2008) highlight the fact that the results in Hall and Jones (1999) can be explained by the impact of institutions, geography and trade, on the efficiency of the economy through the dual economy channel, i.e the relative efficiency. In their paper they found, indeed, that these three factors affect only relative efficiency across sectors, i.e. average labor productivity in the economy relative to labor productivity outside agriculture.
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On the contrary, none of these determinants influences absolute efficiency, measured by the level of TFP in the non-agricultural sector. Inside the debate on the role of institutions, trade and geography, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) demonstrate how the quality of institutions trumps geography and integration. Once institutions are controlled for, trade has no direct effect on income, while geography has at best weak direct effects. By contrast, the institutional quality measure always has a positive and significant coefficient. According to McGuiness (2007) , one channel through which institutions are likely to affect TFP growth is through their influence on a country's ability to learn or absorb new technology from the more advanced leader. Considering a group of 57 countries, the author finds some evidence of a tendency for poorer countries to catch-up with wealthier ones and that the rate of this catch-up can be influenced by the quality of the country's institutions, but the most influential variables appear to 4 This index, created by Political Risk Services, is an average of five indices capturing the quality of government: rule of law; bureaucratic quality; risk of expropriation by the government; government repudiation of contracts, and corruption. 5 A country is open if it satisfies all of the following criteria: nontariff barriers cover less than 40 percent of trade; average tariff rates are less than 40 percent; any black market premium was less than 20 percent during the 1970s and 1980s; the country is not classified as socialist, and the government does not monopolize major exports. 6 Hall and Jones consider social infrastructures determined historically by geographical factors such as distance from the equator, and other factors in part captured by language. 7 A development accounting analysis suggests that as much as 85% of the international variation in aggregate TFP can be attributed to variation in relative efficiency across sectors. 8 As a measure of institutional quality, they use a composite indicator of different elements that capture the protection afforded to property rights as well as the strength of the rule of law.
be the country-specific effects. The focus of Barbarosa and Faria (2011) , on the other hand, is on innovation at the industry level. They investigate the relative importance of institutional variation across European countries in explaining differences in their innovation intensity. The study focuses on three types of country-level market regulation, namely product, labor and financial markets regulation, as well as on the stringency of intellectual property rights, and explore their relationship with industries' innovation intensity. Their findings highlight the fact that stringent product and labor market regulation and the protection of property rights affect innovation intensity negatively.
On the contrary, more developed credit markets foster innovation. Finally, some researchers focus on the interaction of institutions and trade flows. For example, Levchenko (2007) which was faster in regions with more social capital (Helliwell and Putnam, 1995) . Tabellini (2010) concentrates on the effect of culture, measured by indicators of individual values and beliefs, such as trust and respect for others, and confidence in individual self-determination, on economic development in 68 regions of eight European countries. He finds that less trust and respect for others and less confidence in the individual are associated with lower per capita output and slower growth rates, after controlling for country fixed effects, regional education and past urbanization rates. Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose (2016) and Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo (2015) both use the same indicator as this paper, the EQI. Referring to the debate on whether institutions or geography prevail in driving economic growth, Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose (2016) rule of law and government accountability have a limited impact on regional patenting. Gennaioli et al. (2013) extend the analysis by exploring not only the influences of geography and institutions but also human capital, natural resource endowments and culture on per capita income in the case of more than 1500 regions in 110 countries. 11 They find that regional education, geography as well as higher natural resource endowments influence per capita income positively, but regional education account for a large share of within-country variation in per capita income. On the contrary, institutions as measured by assessments of the business environment as well as culture do not help to explain regional differences in per capita income. According to the authors, while some institutions and culture may matter at the national level, they do not help to explain the large income differences within countries.
A number of firm-level studies have been carried out in the past few years, assessing the effects of the institutional environment on firm performance. Some use, as measure of the quality of institutions, the individual evaluation of the constraints for business as reported by the top managers of the interviewed firms. For example, using firm-level data of the garment sector on mostly Asian developing economies, Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae (2005) find that cross-country differences in investment climate as perceived by managers do affect firm performance 12 , even after controlling for country fixed effects; on the contrary, Commander and Svejnar (2011) show that in the case of transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, country fixed effects matter for firm performance, but that differences in the business environment observed by top managers do not.
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10 Amongst the geographical variables considered, are terrain, climate and weather characteristics, distance from the equator, access to the sea and soil characteristics. 11 Variables for geography include average temperature and proximity to the ocean; for natural resource endowment, oil production; for institutions, survey assessments of the business environment in the World Bank Enterprise Survey, and for culture, trust and ethnic heterogeneity. 12 The investment climate measures and the enterprise variables come from World Bank surveys of firms in the garment sector in four countries: Bangladesh, China, India and Pakistan. The authors consider aspects of the investment climate such as how long it takes to get goods through customs or to get a phone line or the frequency and duration of power cuts. 13 Commander and Svejnar use the Business Environment and Enterprises Performance Survey (BEEPS) collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank and consider 26 transition countries. As measure of institutional quality they relate to each firm's top manager's perception of the business environment that his or her firm faces. Considering that this measure may produce biased estimates if a manager's
On the other hand, Bhaumik and Dimova (2014) pool firm-level data of the textile industry from nine developing countries with indicators of institutional quality at the country level. 14 They demonstrate that certain institutions, like restrictive labour market regulations, that are considered bad for economic growth might be beneficial for production efficiency, whereas a good business environment, which is considered beneficial for economic growth, might have an adverse impact on production efficiency. These results suggest that there might be significant differences in the macroand micro-impacts of institutional quality, such that the classification of institutions into "good" and "bad" might depends on the level of analysis. perception of the severity of constraint is, for instance, influenced by the performance of his or her firm, they have used an average value of each constraint reported by other firms in a given industry in each country and year or in a given size in a given industry in each country and year. Moreover, they replicate the analysis with Heritage Foundation indices and World Bank's Doing Business indicators both at the country-level. 14 The source of firms data is World Bank Enterprise Survey of nine developing countries: Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malawi, Pakistan, South Africa and Zambia. The measures of institutional quality are based on indices that capture both the flexibility of institution that affect the recruitment of labor by the firms and the performance of the recruited workers for each country. Moreover, they also consider, as a measure of the quality of the business environment, the indices of institutional quality provided by the Heritage Foundation. 15 Golden-Picci Index measures the corruption level on the basis of the difference between the amounts of physically existing infrastructure and the amounts of money cumulatively allocated by government to create these public works.
Empirical Setting

Firm-level data
The empirical analysis is based on the EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit dataset (EFIGE dataset in short), which is a by-product of the EU project "European Firms in a Global Economy: internal policies for external competitiveness". The dataset contains data from a survey and from balance- firms in each country), followed by the United Kingdom (slightly more than 2000 firms) and
Austria and Hungary (less than 500 in each country). When matching the EFIGE survey with the Amadeus archive, the sample decreases by about 50% because of the many missing-values in Amadeus related to the variables needed to estimate the production function from which the TFP is retrieved (for details, see . From the sample with TFP, the outliers, i.e. firms with a TFP below the first or above the ninety-ninth percentile of the distribution, have
In what follows we refer to the sample EFIGE-AMEDEUS formed by 7239 European firms, the majority of which (more than 84% of the sample) are in France (1568), Spain (2336) and Italy 16 The sampling design has been structured following a three dimension stratification: industry (11 NACE-CLIO industry codes), region (at the NUTS-1 level of aggregation) and size class (10-19; 20-49; 50-250 ; more than 250 employees). Given their importance in aggregate competitiveness dynamics, but their relatively light weight in standard stratification of the population of firms, large firms have been oversampled. 17 In computing the correlation over time (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) ) between some variables in EFIGE dataset (aggregated with proper weighs) and the national statistics provided by EUROSTAT, show that the correlations are 0.82 for labor productivity, 0.71 for labor cost, 0.52 for revenues and 0.61 for workers. Correlations increase to 90% when considering the countries (France, Italy and Spain) with a good quality of balance sheet data. 18 Estimates also control for country and year fixed-effects over the 2001-2009 period. 19 The estimated values of labour and capital elasticities by sector of Bruegel researchers are available in Aiello and Ricotta (2015) , 
The Quality of Regional Government in the EU7-EFIGE countries
The European "quality of government" indicator (EQI) at regional level derives from a new dataset developed by Charron, Lapuente and Rothstein (2010) . This study makes use of a wide survey of 34000 respondents, living in 18 EU states in order to measure the perception of the quality of regional and local governments across Europe. The services in question are education, public health care and law enforcement, services often provided by local authorities in Europe. In Charron, Lapuente and Rothstein (2010) , the definition of QoG, as proposed by Rothstein and Teorell (2008) , is linked to the concept of impartial government institutions, that is "when public officials who implement policies do not take anything about the citizen/case into consideration that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law" (p. 9). The questions of the survey are, thus, aimed at capturing average citizens' perceptions and experiences of corruption, and the extent to which they rate their public services as impartial and of good quality. The answers led to the construction, based on factor analysis, of three composite indices of government quality, reflecting the residents' perception of the three 'pillars' of the regional QoG index: corruption, impartiality and quality. In this study the EQI indicator and its components for the 93 regions of the 7EU-EFIGE countries are considered. In figure 1 the values of the regional EQI indicator are reported separating the regions into two groups: the group with a value of EQI below the median (0.4705) of the regions of the EFIGE sample (Low EQI) and the group with a value higher than the median (High EQI). It is worth noting that, considering how EQI has been calculated, positive and negative values reflect favourable and less favourable institutional environment in comparison to the EU-27 sample.
To sum up, Figure 1 , thus, shows the position of each region both in comparison to the EU7-EFIGE countries, and whether the value is positive or negative, with respect to the EU-27 countries. 1 displays a picture of quality of government in EU7-EFIGE countries that reveals the notable differences across these countries as well as the within-country variation. For the UK only one region is under the median value, the region of London, but its value (0.469) is almost equal to the median.
Half of the number of French regions (21) are in "Low EQI" group (11) and the other half in the "High EQI" group. The regions of the "Low EQI" group, however, all show a positive value.
Among the French regions, Bretagne (1.023), Aquitaine (0.798) and Rhône-Alpes (0.778) exhibit the highest scores. 23 In the report by Charron, Lapuente and Rothstein (2010) the countries are classified according to the levels of withincountry QoG variation. Focusing on the countries of EFIGE sample, Spain and Italy are classified in the group of countries with high within-country QoG variation, Germany, France, UK and Hungary in the group with moderate variation and Austria in the group of low variation (p. 36). 24 For Trentino Alto-Adige, in Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente (2014) the two provinces (NUTS 3) of the region are presented separately. Since the EFIGE data base, considers the Italian NUTS 2 regions, the value of QoG indicator is obtained by using the simple mean of the two provinces. there is no relation between TFP and index for quality, impartiality and corruption, separately.
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These results obtained at the regional level could be not confirmed after replicating the analysis on an individual basis (ecological fallacy). Indeed, in order to control for potential aggregation bias micro-founded analysis is needed. However, working with micro-data leads to the opposite problem related to the absence of any link between individual-level and group-level 25 For Austria since the number of observations in the EFIGE database are few (see table 1), the data of QoG indicators available at NUTS 2 are aggregated at NUTS 1, using the simple mean. Considering the NUTS 2 regions, the highest EQI is registered by one of the regions in Eastern Austria, Burgenland (1.32). 26 Regional average value calculated using TFP at the firm-level. 27 Results are confirmed when equations in figure 2 are augmented by two other regional variables, R&D expenditure and infrastructures (see §3.4.2 for definitions): only EQI shows a positive and significant coefficient while for the three sub-categories the coefficient is not significant (results are available upon request).
relationships (atomistic fallacy). The multilevel approach combines the individual with the ecological and obviates the fallacy of "the wrong level". For this reason, in order to analyse the correlation between firms TFP and the regional QoG indicators, the multilevel methodology is applied. The next section presents this methodological approach. 
Methodology: multilevel models
The objective of the paper is to analyse in a multi-country context, the effect on firm TFP of the quality of government at the regional level. To achieve this objective microdata are used and the firm represents the unit of analysis. However, firms can be nested within regions and regions within countries, so the data are inherently clustered. With such a structure, it is likely that the firms which operate within a particular geographic area are more similar to each other than a randomly selected group of firms would be. Such similarity may be due to the circumstance that they share the same external environment but also to reciprocal influence. This can result in correlated error terms among the individuals within a particular group and, thus, the assumption of independence of OLS estimation is violated, resulting in downwardly biased standard error estimates and large test statistics. By relaxing this assumption, multilevel modeling provides more statistically reliable estimates than those ignoring the hierarchical nature of the data. 28 This technique explicitly models the within-group homogeneity of errors by allowing the estimation of error terms for both the individual and the group. In addition to providing more appropriate significance tests, multilevel models have the ability to simultaneously examine the effects of variables at both individual and group levels, as well as possible cross-level interaction effects. Indeed, in the multilevel analysis, variables at different levels are not simply add-ons to the same single-level equation, but are linked together in ways that make the simultaneous existence of distinct level-one and level-two equations explicit. In such a way, level-two factors are used not just as independent variables to explain variability in a level-one dependent variable, but also to explain variability in random intercept and random slopes (Bickel, 2007) .
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In detail, an econometric specification of a multilevel model may be expressed as follows:
where the y ij is the TFP of firm i in region j, X comprises a set of variables measured at firm level, j 0  is the intercept, The combining of micro (eq. 1) and macro models (eq. 2 and 3) produces a two-level mixed equation:
28 One possibility to relax the assumption of independence is to use OLS with the cluster option. Compared with the OLS without clustering, this option increases the error term to accommodate the lack of independence of firms within regions, However, it leaves both the noise associated with differences between firms and noise associated with differences between regions in the error term while the multilevel model allows the researcher to separate these two errors (see eq. 5) 29 The possibility to employ contextual factors to explain variability in random components is the main difference between the multilevel model and random coefficient regression. The firm VPC is written as the ratio of the firm variance to the total variance: The specification adopted in this paper is a random intercept model (eq. [4] ). In particular, the final model is:
where y it is the 2008-value of TFP (in logarithm) of the i-th firm operating in region j, X is a vector of firm-level variables, QoG is our variable of interest, the indicator of the quality of government, R are a number of control variables at the regional level that, according to the theoretical and empirical literature, may affect firms economic performance, S are sectoral dummies and C country dummies.
3.4.Variables and Measurement
In detail, the variables included in the model are described as follows, distinguishing between first and second level variables.
Firm level variables
The empirical model expressed by eq. First, Human Capital proxied by a dummy variable taking the value of one if, at firm level, the share of graduate workers is higher than the national average for the labor force overall. Qualified employees are expected to influence TFP positively since they provide a firm with the ability not only to innovate, but also to absorb knowledge from other firms (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Griliches 2000) . The second dummy, Innovator, is unity if the firm has introduced at least one innovation (product, process or organisational innovation) during the period surveyed and zero otherwise with the expectation that a firm's performance improves as a result of its propensity for innovation (see, e.g., Mohnen and Hall, 2013; Hall, 2011) . Another firm characteristic considered is whether the firm is part of a group, as membership can provide access to more resources and knowledge that ultimately affect the individual firm's ability to innovate, thereby impacting on TFP (Beugelsdijk 2007) . In particular, two dummy variables are considered to distinguish between national (National group) and foreign (Foreign group) groups. The latter is expected to be more productive since they can capitalize on knowledge accumulated by parent companies abroad and from the advantages of vertical and/or horizontal integration (see, Griffith 1999; Benfratello and Sembenelli 2006; Weche Gelübcke 2013) .
The model includes the dummy Family which is unity if the proportion of managers related to the controlling family is higher than the national average, in order to take into account the possibility that TFP differs between family-managed firms and non-family managed firms (see Schulze and Gedajlovich 2010) . The effect of family management is not certain, as the evidence is mixed (Rutherford, Kuratko, and Holt 2008) . Furthermore, one of the regularities relating to productivity is the positive link between productivity and exports (Melitz 2003; ISGEP 2008; Altomonte, Aquilante, and Ottaviano 2012) . 31 Hence, a dummy taking the value of one if the firm is an exporter in 2008 or before 2008 is included. Regressions also include two dummy variables to control for size effect, one referring to medium-sized (Medium) firms (50-250 employees) and the other to large-sized (Large) firms (more than 250 employees), while small firms represent the control group.
Finally, countries (C) and sectors (S) are treated as fixed effects instead of source of randomness in intercepts since the number of groups (7 and 11, respectively) are too few.
32, Due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is not possible to establish causality between firm TFP and the firm-specific characteristics; thus, one should not interpret eq.
[8] as showing the direction of causality. Consequently, the models in table 3 and 4 should be viewed as a convenient way of summarizing statistical regularities among variables and the results should be read as associations rather than causality.
Regional variables
The variable of interest is the QoG indicator, EQI, and its components already described in section 2.2.
In order to take into account the role played by the characteristics of the regional economic system, two regional variables are included. They are total intramural R&D expenditure (Euro per inhabitant) and infrastructure density defined by motorway kilometers standardized by total regional area (Kilometers per 1000 km 2 ). The first indicator is meant to capture the ability of a region to create innovation and convert knowledge spillovers into innovative capacity, thus increasing productivity. Therefore, a positive effect of this variable on TFP is expected. The second indicator is a proxy for infrastructure considered by economic theory at the root of differences in productivity. Regions with higher stock of infrastructure are expected to show higher levels of TFP.
Eurostat's region database is the source for the regional control variables and the value refers to 2007.
31 Two hypotheses about the positive correlation between export activity and productivity have been extensively investigated. The first hypothesis is that the most productive firms self-select into foreign markets because they can overcome sunk costs associated with foreign sales (ISGEP 2008; Melitz 2003) . The second hypothesis raises the possibility of "learning by exporting". Firms participating in international markets acquire knowledge and technology with positive feedback as regards knowledge and technology. Furthermore, firms which are active in world markets are exposed to more intensive competition than firms which only sell their products domestically. 32 In the multilevel approach a key issue to be addressed concerns the sample size at any level of analysis. Indeed, the requirements of precise measurement of between-group variance impose a "sufficient" number of clusters. Although there are some, albeit very different from each other, rules of thumb, a clear indication does not exist in this respect (Richter 2006) . Some authors suggest that 20 is a sufficient number of groups (Heck and Thomas 2000; Rabe-Hasketh and Skondal 2008) , others 30 (Hox, 2002) or 50 (Mass and Hox 2004) . In addition, it is worth noting that in randomeffects models the clusters must be sized with at least two observations. The alternative is a fixed-effects approach in which the number of groups is not important, although their dimension then becomes crucial as the estimated groupeffect is unreliable for small-sized groups. Motorway kilometers standardized by total regional area (Km per 1000 km 2 ). As can be seen from column 1 of the table 2, VPC values show that region-specific factors capture 14% of the total TFP variance, while the remaining (86%) is explained by firms. Column 2 reveals that the first result varies dramatically when country-dummy variables are introduced: the role of regions drops to 5%. 33 Comparing the "empty model" with an extended specification of the model (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008), it is possible to quantify the proportion of TFP variability at the second-level of the model (regions) which is due to country-effect. 34 This proportion is equal to 66%, i.e. two-thirds of the variance assigned to the region-effect is a between-country effect. The proportion of regional variance explained increases to 72% from 66% when dummies for sectors are introduced. Sector membership only explains a limited proportion of heterogeneity due to regions (table 3 column 3) . Firm-level variables absorb 20% of the variance estimated at the firstlevel of the hierarchy while the proportion of regional variance explained increases slightly from 72% to 78% (table 3, column 4).
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33 The country-dummies are highly significant, except for Austria, which is similar to the controlling group (Germany). The estimated parameters of country-dummies confirm the considerable differences in productivity across European countries. Italy, Spain are at the lower bound, followed by UK and France. Germany, Austria and Hungary lead the group. 34 The coefficient of determination for the two-level model is given by:
where N stands for the null model and M for the model of interest. The proportional reduction in each of the variance components can be calculated separately. The proportion of the level-2 variance explained by the covariates is: Using the same dataset and methodology, these results have already been obtained by Aiello and Ricotta (2016) . Indeed, they have measured how much TFP heterogeneity is due to firm-specificities or sector membership and how As far as the role of firm characteristics in explaining TFP, except for exporter, all other variables have a significant coefficient. In line with expectations and the results of previous literature, a firm that uses more human capital, that innovates or belongs to a group shows a higher productivity. Moreover, consistent with previous evidence, the TFP is higher for medium-sized firms and even higher for large enterprises. As regards the variable Family Management, family involvement in firm management seems to be negatively related to TFP for the sample of 7EU-EFIGE firms. Finally, no significant association between internationalization and TFP has been found, in contrast with the literature showing that exporters self-select and over-perform (Wagner, 2007; ISGEP, 2008; Altomonte, Aquilante, and Ottaviano 2012) . On the contrary, this result seems to support the argument that the export premium may be the result of an omitted variables bias such as membership in a foreign group (Crozet, Méjan, and Zignago 2011) 36 and being an innovator (Cassiman, Goloso, and Martinez-Ros 2010) .
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The relationship between the control variables at the regional level and TFP is as expected:
firms located in a region with high level of R&D and good infrastructure show higher level of TFP.
The first result is consistent with Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose (2012) but not the second one.
Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose (2012), considering 120 regions in the EU during the period 1990-2004, evidence that transport infrastructure endowment is a relatively poor predictor of regional economic growth while, by contrast, local R&D, social conditions, and migration are much better predictors of economic performance.
As far as the specific scope of this paper is concerned, model 5 shows that the regional quality of government has a positive connection with firm TFP. Focusing on the studies that analyse the role of institutions at the regional level, this finding is in line with previous research which underlines their importance for economic growth (Tabellini, 2010; Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose 2016) , the capacity of regions to innovate (Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015) and productivity (Lasagni, Nifo and Vecchione 2015; Aiello, Pupo and Ricotta, 2014; Manzocchi, Quintieri and Santoni, 2014) . On the contrary, the result contradicts the hypothesis that within country much depends on localization. They demonstrate that TFP heterogeneity is largely due to firm-specific features and that country-effect is more influential than region-effect in explaining individual productivity. 36 Crozet, Méjan, and Zignago (2011) argue that the exporter productivity premium could be due to omitted variables, correlated to the probability to export as, for example, belonging to a foreign group. Barba Navaretti et al. (2011) show that firms belonging to a foreign group are more likely to be exporters and this finding may suggest a cost reduction effect stemming from belonging to a foreign group. 37 Cassiman, Goloso, and Martinez-Ros (2010) suggest that one potential underlying mechanism for the selection of more productive firms in the export market could be the fact that successful innovation improves the firm's productivity and, hence, these more productive firms became exporters. As a result, the omission of an innovation variable from the analysis may lead to the overestimation of the productivity-export association. Using a panel of Spanish manufacturing firms for the period 1990-1998 they find support for their hypothesis. However, as far as French firms are concerned, Bellone, Guillou, and Nesta (2009) show that the introduction of innovation does not significantly alter the size of the export premium.
institutional differences do not matter for economic performance (Gennaioli et al., 2013) . The result is also consistent with the findings of country-level studies such as, among others, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) , Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), Chanda and Dalgaardi (2008) , Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) , Barbarosa and Faria (2011) , that provide evidence of the importance of QoG on economic performance.
The regional variables help to explain the TFP variability at the regional level: the proportion of regional variance explained increases from 78% to 87%.
Considering the individual components of EQI, it is possible to assess which aspects of the quality of government are important for TFP. The results show that corruption and the quality of services is positively correlated to TFP, while the evidence is inconclusive for the impartiality
index. An efficient and non-bureaucratic provision of public services as well as a low level of local corruption seem to be important factors also for good firm performance as already evidenced by Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose (2016) 
Robustness checks
The aim of this section is to test the robustness of the results. First, the possibility that QoG indicator may capture aspects related to the nature of state governance is investigated. In fact, the supporters of federalism stress that devolving resources and authority from national to subnational government levels may stimulate more efficient and better targeted public policies. In parentheses, t-values. Level of significance: *** 1%, ** 5%. Sector and country dummies included.
Concluding remarks
Institutional quality has gained a particularly important role in the EU general framework of sustainable development and regional policy (Farole, Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, 2011) . This paper aims to analyse the effect of regional quality of government (QoG) on firm TFP in a multicountry context, considering a group of EU countries. The study is based on EFIGE database, a comparable cross-country data of manufacturing firms operating in seven European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom). The measure of the 'quality of government' is the European QoG Index (EQI), as provided by Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente (2014) .
The unit of analysis is the firm; this represents the most appropriate level to test whether the regional institutional environment affects productivity since it overcomes the fallacy of "the wrong level" and can also account for the difference in the macro-and micro-impacts of institutional quality. In order to disentangle internal from external productivity drivers, the multilevel approach is employed. This more sophisticated approach specifically takes into account the fact that firms are clustered into regions and handle simultaneously the micro-scale of firms and the macro-scale of regions. In so doing, it guarantees a better standard error estimation and allows the researcher to assess the heterogeneity in firm-level performance due to within-region variation in firm characteristics and the proportion due to differences in the regional context.
Results refer to 2008 and show, as expected, the importance of firm-specific determinants of TFP. However, the context in which firms operate plays a role in determining individual TFP.
Results show that the regional endowment of infrastructure and the investments in R&D exert a positive effect on firm performance: firms located in a region with high level of R&D and good infrastructure show higher level of TFP.
As far as the specific scope of this paper is concerned, the quality of regional government is positively correlated with firm TFP. This is in line with previous research which underlines the importance of the quality of institutions at the regional level and it refutes the hypothesis that within country institutional differences do not matter for economic performance. When considering the QoG components, the quality of services and the fight against corruption seem to be important for good firm performance in the EFIGE-7 countries. The evidence is, however, inconclusive as regards impartiality. The results are robust to several robustness checks.
The policy implications arising from the findings of this research are limited by data constraints. In particular, given the cross-sectional nature of the data it is impossible to establish the direction of causality and to claim that the quality of regional government is an exogenous cause of TFP. However, on the basis of correlational evidence arising from this research, a region with low QoG is likely to be characterized by low productivity, but, as already evidenced by Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo (2015) , this type of region may also be unable to use cohesion and other funds effectively. So the risk is that regions with low QoG may be trapped in low competitiveness and low growth. This is an important issue because existing regional inequalities already pose a threat to the cohesion of the European Union. In the current context of slow growth, high unemployment and fiscal stringency in EU countries, efforts aimed at improving the quality of local government and, eradicating favoritism and corruption in the exercise of the public administration, may thus represent a means to help less-favoured regions to overcome low competitiveness.
